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In the first part of this article I shall reflect on some of
the reasons that have been advanced for the lack of
progress on disarmament and development. My
arguments are based on my position as chairman from
1978 to 1981 of the United Nations Group of
Governmental Experts on the Relationship between
Disarmament and Development - whose members
came from 27 countries, from the West and from the
East, from the industrial North as well as from the
developing South, and on experience I have gained
since then by continuously examining this crucial
issue. In the second part I shall try to develop some
ideas about how to put the disarmament-development
relationship back on the international agenda.
However, before I discuss the reasons why, as the task
given to me seems to indicate, something went wrong,
let me recall the mandate given to, and the main
conclusions arrived at, by the UN Group. In
accordance with the mandate of the General Assembly
our three main tasks were as follows:
to assess present day utilisation of human and
material resources for military purposes;
to analyse the economic and social effects of the
arms ¿ace on such elements of the economy, at
national and international levels, as economic
growth and productivity, employment and
inflation, international trade and international
monetary systems;
to look into foreseeable short and long term
problems that might appear when, in a
disarmament situation, resources could be
converted from military to constructive civilian
purposes.
I should also like to emphasise that the General
Assembly asked us to make the study forward-looking
and policy-oriented, with particular emphasis on the
possibilities of making a contribution to the
establishment of a New International Economic
Order.
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The Group arrived at three main conclusions:
The world finds itself at a crossroads. It can either
continue to pursue the arms race or it can move
towards a more sustainable economic and
political order. It cannot do both, because the
arms race and development compete for the same
resources;
Irrespective of economic systems and levels of
economic development, all countries would
benefit economically from an effective dis-
armament process. They would thus have a
mutual enlightened self-interest in disarmament;
In a disarmament situation, governments would
face certain conversion problems. If solutions to
these problems were well planned and prepared,
they would cause no serious technical and
economic difficulties.
In approving the Group's report, including its
recommendations, the General Assembly in 1982
advised Governments of Member States:
to reconsider their present policies of secrecy
concerning the real costs, economic, social and
human, inherent in military resource use;
to start to plan and prepare for a conversion
process which could be implemented in a
disarmament situation.
At this stage I must state that, like so many other
economists world-wide, I believe firmly that the
economic factor - at least over the longer run quite
decisively works for disarmament. In my view, the
reason why this argument has not come more forcibly
to the fore is the extraordinarily short-sighted and
unimaginative policies of the political leaders of the
major powers, who appear to believe that the task
entrusted to them by their voters is to promote peace
through military strength - indeed, if possible
through military superiority. These are dangerously
outdated concepts of national security, in the 40th
year of the nuclear age and in an increasingly
interdependent world.
Thus, I do not believe that the failure so far of the
political leaders of the dominant powers to recognise
that an intensified arms race will ultimately bring
economic ruin, is due to gaps or inconsistencies in the
UN study or for that matter in the Brandt and Palme
reports. The facts are there, in the case of the UN study
collected through a research programme involving
more than 100 economists around the world. The
analyses are there, as well as the conclusions and the
recommendations. The time is ripe for decisions and
action.
But to make the required decisions and actions would
of course require rather drastic changes in the
behaviour of political leaders everywhere, and
particularly those of the dominant military powers.
The UN Governmental Expert Group was aware of
this. But it was also painfully aware that it was not
within its mandate, nor within its competence to
suggest the necessary means by which these decisions
could be reached. To achieve this, to create a political
constituency for disarmament, would require a
political process at the national level, something to
which a Governmental Group within the UN
unfortunately cannot directly contribute.
But there are other reasons why the international
system can to some extent be blamed for the present
deadlock. In my views there is not enough
understanding of the interlinkages between the
numerous global crises of our times, including the
arms race. To isolate this particular global problem
from the world economic crisis with all its components
- the resource scarcities, the polarisation of wealth
and poverty within and among nations, to mention
but two of the global problems of our age - is to
disregard some of the fundamental reasons for the
social and political unrest now liable to emerge at both
national and international levels, with increasingly
dangerous repercussions.
This becomes painfully evident when one looks at the
way in which countries in the so-called Third World
have been affected by the arms race and the
international trade in weapons. First, there is the need
to recall the well known fact that almost all of the
numerous armed conflicts in the world since 1945 have
occurred in the Third World [United Nations 1983].
One of the many reasons for this tragic situation seems
to be the links between the East-West conflict and the
almost complete lack of progress in the North-South
dialogue. These links have several dimensions. Here,
in my view, are some of them:
Political: Though being so absorbed by the East-West
conflict, the major powers fail to react to polarisation
between rich countries in the industrial North and
poor countries in the developing South.
Economic: By continuing and intensifying the arms
race, the parties to the East-West conflict worsen the
world-wide economic crisis, the costs of which tend to
be imposed on the South much more than on the
North.
Military: The parties to the East-West conflict,
especially the superpowers, make it more difficult to
solve conflicts between countries in the South, by tying
developing countries, or groups of developing
countries, to their respective military blocs in order to
serve their own purposes and to strengthen their own
power positions.
As I see it, the superpowers in their arrogance conduct
their policies with respect to the small and medium
powers of the world only in relation to the significance
of these nations to their own mutual and conflict-
ridden relationship. They are able to behave in this
manner because of their present economic, technical,
military and, thus, political dominance, which also
enables them to ignore the United Nations, when they
find it expedient.
No wonder then, that the superpowers, but also major
military powers, consider themselves entitled to
intervene more or less openly in conflicts in the Third
World. A Hungarian researcher, Istvan Kende, has
estimated that out of 120 armed conflicts between
1945 and 1975, in 70 - well over half - there was
outside intervention from the North [Kende 1980]. In
no year since 1945 have there been less than four major
armed conflicts in progress in the Third World. The
same interventionist approach is reflected in the flow
of arms from the industrialised to the developing
world, entailing rapidly increasing militarisation, as
well as the maintenance ofa global network of military
facilities and bases, with over 1.8 m soldiers currently
stationed on foreign territory, including that of
around 70 developing countries.
Arms deliveries to developing countries (according to
the figures of the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency) have increased from $14.4bn in constant
1981 dollars in 1972 to $28.2bn in 1982. Agreements
rose even more steeply, from $10.Sbn in 1973 to
$46.2 bn in 1980. Industrialised countries in the North
have been only too eager to play the supplier. Indeed,
during the world economic crisis the arms industries in
the North have been among the few sectors that have
continued to flourish. In 1984, according to a report
released by the US Census Bureau in April 1985, 10 of
the largest arms industries realised on average a 25 per
cent return on equity compared to an average return of
12.8 per cent for other manufacturers.
What, then, are the economic effects of arms imports
on the economies of the South? A number of the
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40-odd research reports submitted to the UN for our
study on the relationship between disarmament and
development show that increased military spending
tends to be related to lower investment, to greater tax
burdens, to cuts in consumption and social welfare
spending and to inflation. In recent years another
factor has come into prominence: the addition to the
debt burden. In a study that I recently undertook for
the Swedish Government, it was found that arms
imports are responsible for around 25 per cent of the
debt burden of countries in the South. Another
estimate, reported in the UN 1985 Report on the
World Social Situation, indicates that in at least 4 of
the 20 countries with the largest foreign debt in 1983,
the value of arms imports amounted to 39 to 40 per
cent or more of the rise in debt between 1976 and 1980
[UN 1985].
The negative effects in social and human terms are also
considerable. In a report to the UN Group, the
American economists Bruce Russett and David
Sylvan estimated various social opportunity costs of
arms purchases, examining their potential relationship
to health and literacy. They found that for an average
developing country, with a population of 8.5 mn and a
GNP per capita of around $350 (at 1970 prices), the
first $200 mn of arms imports would add approximately
20 additional infant deaths per 1,000 live births,
decrease average life expectancy by three to four years,
and result in 13 to 14 fewer literate adults out of every
100.
It can be reasonably assumed that such a deterioration
of conditions of human life would also result in
increased social tensions and political unrest. And in
the unfortunately numerous developing countries
ruled by military or authoritarian regimes, this could
well be another reason for the use of military force to
keep internal tensions and unrest under control.
However, in the 1980s there has occurred a rather
remarkable shift in the pattern of the international
arms trade, most markedly in terms of the total
volume of sales. According to a recent US
Congressional Research Service report [Grimmet
1984] both arms transfers and arms deliveries have
been substantially reduced. Agreements plunged from
a record high of $46.8 bn in 1982 to $24.7 bn in 1983, a
drop of 47 per cent. In its 1985 Yearbook, the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) notes a similar decline in arms deliveries. This
decline follows directly from the world-wide economic
crisis and the closely related debt problems faced by so
many countries in the Third World. The fact is that the
hard currency earnings needed to purchase arms are
no longer there and, because of the international debt
crisis, credits to buy them are not available either.
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Some might think ¡have dealt unduly with the military
situation in countries in the South. However, ¡ happen
to believe that the latter not only cause serious
political, economic, social and human problems in
Third World countries themselves, but could be
decisive for the future of the rest of the world. In spite
of the terrifying arms race between the superpowers,
the disarmament-development debate takes on
ominous proportions when looked at from a Third
World perspective.
I now turn to the second part of this article: how and in
what form could disarmament and development be
put back on the international agenda?
First, I should say that in the UN context the issue is
alive and well. By a decision at the 37th session of the
Assembly in 1982 when the UN report,.including its
conclusions and recommendations, was approved -
it will be placed on the agenda 'at regular intervals'
beginning with the 40th session in Autumn. This
implies that governments of Member States will be
continously reminded of its existence, whatever that is
worth. Furthermore, the General Assembly has
decided to convene a special UN Conference on
Disarmament and Development, in early Autumn
1986. My own experience is that this has stimulated
favourable reactions around the world, not least
among influential groups of international non-
governmental organisations.
But, what happens in the real world? The Brandt,
Palme and Thorsson reports have not yet stirred the
international political community because - as
already stated - of the myopic and outdated security
concepts of today's dominant political leaders, leading
them to neglect the extent of the mutital enlightened
self-interest among nations in an increasipgly
interdependent world. Unfortunately, other pressures
will continue to impose themselves on political events.
Above all, the arms race has become a major factor in
the world economic crisis, influencing economies all
over the world. The sharp decline in Third World arms
purchases is an early warning. Purchases may not
remain at their present low level, but specialists in the
international arms trade seem to believe that they will
never again reach the peak of 1982.
However, the economic effects of the arms race are not
confined to the countries of the South. The USSR is
not the only major power which will be forced to
discover the need for its own disarmament-
development strategy. Whatever President Reagan
said in the 1984 election campaign and whatever the
indications of economic recovery in the United States,
it is likely that the difficulties apparent in US civilian
industry will remain, and that the competitiveness of
American products will continue to decline unless US
military expenditures are brought to a standstill or
reduced. No trade war with Japan or Europe will
rescue an economy whose GNP growth has mainly
depended on an absurd military build-up, and which
devotes between 35-40 per cent of its total R & D to
military purposes, denying civil industries the
resources badly needed for innovation and moderni-
sation. The continued effects of soaring military
expenditures and budget, trade and (for the first time
this century) balance of payments deficits are said to
have made the richest economy in the world a net
debtor to the outside world to the tune of about
$lOObn.
It is generally acknowledged that the only really safe
basis for national security is a strong and sound
economy. The time will come, perhaps in the late
1980s or early 1990s, when not only the US but also
other major military powers will be compelled by
economic circumstances to change their present
course, to reduce their military spending and to
convert their available and productive resources to
civilian production.
I believe that the UN Study and the research reports on
which it is based have proved that conversion is
technically and economically possible. But the
conversion process must be well planned in advance,
i.e. before a disarmament process is initiated. As part
of this preparation process it is crucial to refute the
argument so often advanced when new weapon
systems are debated, that military expenditures and
military production create employment. To give a
striking example, taken from the MX debate in the US
Congress during Spring 1985, one representative is
reported as saying that the full MX programme would
generate on average 32,000 jobs a year over the next
decade in direct employment, and as many as 95,000 if
spin-offs to service industries are also included. As is
so often the case, however, this is just another example
of the disregard of the opportunity costs of military
expenditures. How much and what kind of employ-
ment could be created by a civilian use of the same
resources? One of the economists who has done some
of the most extensive research on conversion,
Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University,
recently pointed out that some 300,000 technicians
and workers in the US and probably as many again in
the USSR would lose their jobs if there were a mutual
halt in the production of nuclear weapons. Hundreds
of companies would also suffer substantial reductions
in their revenues and profits. However, his conclusion
was that these barriers to arms reduction are not
immutable. Rather they reflect a failure in both
countries to plan for conversion of military industries,
installations and laboratories.
Many others including myself, have pointed out that if
major weapon-producing countries were to publicise
detailed plans for converting their armaments
industries to the manufacture of other products when
disarmament agreements are being negotiated,
confidence in their sincerity would be greatly
enhanced. Such unilateral steps would be a major
confidence-building measure, improving the inter-
national atmosphere without incurring any risk.
Against this background, it is a pity that more
governments have not adhered to the General
Assembly resolution they voted for in 1982 when
approving the UN study's conclusions and recom-
mendations, under which governments were asked to
undertake national follow-up studies to look into
preparation for conversion.
To the best of my knowledge, only the Swedish
government has undertaken such a national follow-up
study. In September 1983, the Swedish government
asked me to undertake a study examining how a
country like Sweden could, in the context of a broader
process of disarmament in Europe, reduce its defence
spending and convert resources needed for military
purposes into constructive civilian use.
The main tasks given to me were as follows:
to describe the nature and magnitude of Sweden's
present defence efforts in economic and social
terms:
to give examples of defence resources which, in
the event of varying degrees of disarmament, can
be converted to other purposes;
to state the feasibility of defence-sector con-
version and its problems in different peace
perspectives;
to state how a conversion of resources from
defence to civilian use might also make a
contribution to Sweden's international develop-
ment cooperation with the developing countries.
My report was transmitted to the government in
August 1984. There is no space to detail the findings
and conclusions here. Let me only state that if there
were to take place a gradual reduction of troops and
weapon systems in Europe, this would allow for an
equally gradual reduction of Swedish defence
expenditures, making possible a process of conversion.
Considering the size of the Swedish defence
establishment and the Swedish defence industries
within the Swedish economy, this would not cause
major macroeconomic problems. But it would create
certain microeconomic problems, both regionally and
in human terms. These would have to be looked into
very carefully, particularly at the local level, where
local communities can be highly defence-dependent.
Disarmament is a positive and inevitably political
process, its consequences occurring as the result of
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political decisions. Thus, no single human being, and
no single family need experience it as a threat to their
own economic security and future.
Although the Swedish study does not necessarily
establish a model for other countries, it shows that the
recommendations made in the UN report can in
principle be put into effect. The next question is how to
convince governments that they ought to be
implemented. I should not be happy to see
governments, at present mostly indifferent, having to
learn their lessons the hard way. Meanwhile, as is so
often the case, their peoples will be the ones to suffer.
However, interest in the disarmament-development
issue is increasing in many parts of the world.
Conferences and seminars are organised, study groups
are formed, public meetings are held. I hope this
augurs well, not only for the discussion of the issue at
the 40th General Assembly session, but also for the
special UN Conference on Disarmament and
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Development in 1986. Let it not be forgotten that
governments are only likely to respond positively if
they are obliged to, as a consequence of constructive
political action from their own citizens.
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